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New Rules – Old Games? Social Capital and Privatisation in France, 1986-1998 
 
 
This article focuses on social capital among the French business elite, the period under 
study coinciding with the implementation of privatisation programmes in France from 
1986 to 1998. The Chirac government (1986-1988) sought to change the rules of the 
economic game, the political aspirations invested in privatisation centring on the free 
play of market forces and competition, to which the programme purported to reconcile 
the public at large. The article reveals how privatisation, far from breaking with the past 
by widening participation in economic life, strengthened the ties that bind the French 
establishment elite through the concentration of power in ‘hard cores’ of stable investors 
in newly privatised firms. High levels of social capital within the French national 
business system ensured that members of the ruling elite, united by multiple ties and 
similar backgrounds, connived, as before, to manipulate institutions and situations in 
their perceived collective interest. 
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‘The [French] government has a long arm and a short arm: the long arm is 
used to take and extends everywhere; the short arm is used to give, but only 
reaches those in close proximity’ (Ignazio Silone, Le Pain et le vin (1937), 
cited in Hamdouch, L’Etat d’influence, 51.) 
 
 
Privatisation in France, launched with much fanfare in 1986 by the right-wing 
government of Jacques Chirac, during his second term as Prime Minister, sought to bring 
far-reaching change to the French economic landscape.
1
 Edouard Balladur, Minister of 
the Economy, Finance and Privatisation (1986-1988), proclaimed at the time that 
privatisation was a means to ‘change the rules of the [economic] game’2 by effecting ‘the 
most important shift in the boundary between the public and private sectors witnessed so 
far in the West’.3 ‘French capitalism after privatisation’, he concluded, ‘will not look the 
way it did before’.4 The government aimed not only to reverse the nationalisations which 
had taken place under the socialists four years previously, but more importantly to 
introduce new rules for the economy on two counts. First, it aimed to widen participation 
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in economic life by turning the French populace into a nation of shareholders, a notion 
cherished by de Gaulle; and second, it sought to turn the underdeveloped Paris Bourse 
into the dynamic hub of French business.
5
 
Privatisation in France, broadly defined, is the process of releasing corporate 
organisations from public ownership either progressively, in stages, or in a single move. 
It is, as political scientists Vickers and Wright observe, ‘an umbrella term for many 
different policies loosely linked by the way in which they are taken to mean a 
strengthening of the market at the expense of the state’.6 In France, this objective stood in 
stark contrast to the long-standing tradition of state intervention in the economy, 
stretching back to Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), Secretary of State under Louis 
XIV. Colbert has lent his name to the enduring practice of dirigisme through 
discriminatory fiscal and public procurement policies, designed to promote public and 
private national champions while supporting nascent industries.
7
 In the post-war period, 
‘Colbertism’ has been practiced in various guises by political regimes of both right and 
left, including those of de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard, Mitterrand, Chirac and, most 
recently, Sarkozy. 
This article explores how the extensive social capital of the French business elite 
facilitated the smooth release of state assets into private ownership during intensive 
privatisation in France between 1986 and 1998. The term ‘social capital’ refers to the 
resources embodied in the structure of relationships between actors.
8
 Sociologists 
Anheier et al. define it as the ‘sum of the actual and potential resources that can be 
mobilized through membership in social networks of actors and organizations’,9 
confirming the observation of Adler and Kwon that ‘the goodwill that others have 
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towards us is a valuable resource’.10 By analysing social capital formation and 
exploitation in its social context, we can find deeply embedded transactional structures 
that are self-replicating and a source of continuity amidst ostensibly extensive (but 
ultimately superficial) change. As Pamela Laird explains in Pull, revealing the existence 
of social capital and the mechanisms by which it works ‘embeds individuals’ stories into 
their social and cultural context’.11  
Privatisation provides a privileged window on the workings of social capital 
among the late twentieth-century French business elite. With the large-scale sale of 
public assets through extensive privatisation, behaviour which would normally have 
remained hidden from view became, to a degree, more transparent, shedding light on the 
patterns of friendship and loyalty at the heart of French corporate business. While the 
rules of the economic game may have changed through privatisation, the structure and 
objective of the game itself remained unchanged. The logic of the French national 
business system, as reconstituted after the Second World War, and stemming from the 
concentration of power in the hands of elite economic actors (the ruling triumvirate of 
closely-knit politicians, state officials and business leaders), has been one of ‘defend at 
home and attack abroad’. The pursuit of scale, scope and technological sophistication has 
been at the heart of both industrial policies and business strategies. The Chirac 
government of 1986-88 never intended that privatisation should expose French business 
to the chill winds of foreign competition, but rather that it should strengthen the ties 
which traditionally bind the French business elite, bolstering establishment solidarity in 
support of French business interests at home and overseas.
12
 Far from widening 
participation in economic life, as Balladur asserted in his book, Je crois en l’homme plus 
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qu’en l’Etat (‘I believe in man more than in the state’), privatisation resulted in a 
considerable strengthening of the privileges of the establishment elite through the 
concentration of power in ‘hard cores’ of stable investors in newly privatised firms, often 
peopled by personal friends of Balladur.
13
 The ties that bind the French business elite are 
institutional, strong and frequently endogenous, with networking among the elites being 
an institutional feature in France, systemically embedded, and supported by the state.  
The argument builds upon and extends earlier studies of privatisation and the 
postwar evolution of the French national business system.
14
 It draws upon contemporary 
writings and interviews with members of the elite involved in the privatisation 
movement. At the core of the research is a study of the lives, careers and networks of the 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the 15 largest privatised companies (or, where 
appropriate, successor companies) in France in 1998 (see Table 1), exposing the links 
between them, the commonality of membership of boards and organisations, and the 
exercise of power through elite networks. The seamless transition from public to private 
ownership, from old to new rules, was accomplished by putting social capital to work in 
pursuit of common cause: the preservation and advancement of the ruling elite of 
business leaders, state officials and politicians under the new rules as under the old. The 
new rules ensured the continuation of the old game into the twenty-first century: plus ça 
change, plus c’est la même chose.  
 
[Insert Table 1]  
 
Social Capital and the French Business Elite 
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The social structure of any society shapes and informs the behaviour of its actors. As the 
economic historian John Sawyer explains, ‘economic activities, while powerfully 
molding the social forms and class relationships of a society, are themselves a function of 
the total social structure’.15 Societies, he argues, naturally prescribe patterns of normative 
conduct, to which in-built sanctions exhort conformity. The concepts and lexicon of 
social capital arguably enable us to get closer to the processes which inform and direct 
patterns of conduct, providing a useful lens through which to observe and analyse the 
behaviour of elite members and their networks. Members of the French business elite, 
whether established or aspiring, have depended to a large degree on social capital for 
their careers’ development and continuing success. Those who reach the highest echelons 
of France’s largest companies form, as sociologist Dean Savage asserts, ‘the single most 
coherent force within French business leadership’, who ‘more than any other group… are 
chosen by others’.16 The importance of social capital calls into question the alleged 
meritocratic basis of elite member selection in France. As Laird insists, the mechanisms 
that facilitate or hinder access to ‘the circles that control and distribute opportunity and 
information’ matter most in determining who reaches the top in any given field.17 In 
particular, Bourdieu suggests that social stratification and ranking are intrinsic to the 
modern French consciousness.
18
 Despite ridding itself of a hated aristocracy, modern 
France has, according to Sawyer, ‘inherited patterns of social stratification that the 
Revolution and the Republic have never completely eliminated… The craftsman or 
villager as well as the count tended to identify himself, his skills, and his heirs with a 
given place in the social hierarchy’.19 In the modern French context, the mechanisms that 
assist or impede access to elite business circles are primarily the elite institutions of 
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higher education, prominent among which are the Ecole Polytechnique, the Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences-Po), and the specialist engineering grandes écoles 
such as Ecole des Mines (see Table 2). 
 Capital, of course, takes many forms, notably financial, physical, organisational, 
intellectual, political, symbolic and social.
20
 Broadly, these fall under four headings: 
economic capital (comprising financial, organisational and tangible assets), cultural 
capital (knowledge, tastes, cultural dispositions and accomplishments), symbolic capital 
(title, honours, reputation and the like) and social capital (networks, including political 
connections, family and relationships).
21
  
Social capital is a key resource that enables an individual to access other forms of 
capital in the production of goods and services, and it may be deployed internally within 
a business or externally within business networks. An individual’s social capital at a 
given point in time may be defined as the sum of the value of productive connections 
possessed by the individual. In a business context, a productive connection is one with a 
positive economic value that might be accessed and harnessed in pursuit of a business 
objective. The connection creates the possibility of access by Actor A to the resources at 
the command of Actor B; however, access is not guaranteed, nor is it unconditional or 
without cost. Access depends crucially on the quality of the connection. The quality of a 
connection depends critically on the willingness of one actor to act in support of another, 
and this in turn depends on perceived trustworthiness, goal congruence (mutual 
advantage in granting access to network resources), and the potential value of reciprocal 
access to resources. 
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The potential for trust arises when actors have similar mindsets, dispositions and 
experiences. Various social scientists highlight the importance of what they term 
‘enforceable trust’, the means by which social capital is created by individual members’ 
strict obedience to group expectations, and through which collective trust becomes a 
powerful ‘expectational asset’,22 cementing relationships and building confident 
expectations regarding the future.
23
 Likewise, goal congruence can emerge when actors 
share values and behaviours forged through similar experiences in familiar structures. 
Individuals from the same social class and who attended the same types of school and 
institutions of higher education are more likely, in sharing similar worldviews, to connect 
with one another than with outsiders. Thus, families, schools and institutions of higher 
learning serve as formative structures that build connections. Elite groups, bonded 
through networks of connections, exhibit strong commonalities both within and across 
generations. Through common frames of reference the network becomes a ‘community of 
practice’, as Davis and Greve put it, informed by shared understandings and assumptions 
which in turn determine the perception of strategies and goals as legitimate or deviant. 
Those from the ‘right’ background are more connectable than others, that is more likely 




The potency of the French education system as an elite ‘structuring structure’ is 
confirmed in Table 2.
25
 Seven of the heads of the 15 largest privatised companies in 1998 
attended an elite Parisian lycée (including Janson-de-Sailly, Condorcet, Louis-le-Grand, 
Saint-Louis and Henri IV), while five attended an elite provincial lycée. As many as eight 
CEOs graduated from Polytechnique, seven from Sciences-Po, and three from the Ecole 
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des Mines. Notably, all 15 CEOs attended a prestigious institution of higher education. 
Eight went on to study at the highly acclaimed Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), 
established in 1945 to train top civil servants and cabinet ministers. Polytechnique and 
ENA are, along with the Ecole Normale Supérieure, the most prestigious institutions of 
higher education in modern France, described by Bourdieu as ‘avenues to the highest 
social positions’.26 Passage through an elite grande école may serve as a prelude to 
joining a grand corps, the pinnacle of France’s civil service elite, accession to which 
depends on the rank obtained in final examinations. Among the most highly prized corps 
are the Inspection des Finances, the Corps des Mines and the Corps des Ponts et 
Chaussées. As Table 2 reveals, 10 of the 15 CEOs of leading privatised firms in 1998 
were corpsards, including six Inspecteurs des Finances, and four from the Corps des 
Mines.  
At first sight the French educational system might appear inherently meritocratic: 
a good passage through the right places should help to propel the beneficiary towards a 
successful career. Yet coming from a ‘good’ family boosts the individual’s life chances 
significantly, pointing the way to what may be possible. This is a key point. Barsoux and 
Lawrence argue that the career development of leading French managers is 
fundamentally inegalitarian, ‘a matter of sponsorship rather than ability’.27 The 
sociologist Dominique Monjardet agrees: ‘The principle of their selection and the base of 
their power is external – it is controlled delegation [of power] by a superior influence, or 
it has to do with social ties. Nothing here evokes the independent manager selected 
according to merit’.28  
 10 
The staying power of social capital assets implies a strong, deeply-rooted 
tendency which honours loyalty to a particular network over competence. French elites, 
however, can answer that charge by pointing to the rigorous selection procedures and 
competitive examinations of elite schools, which are theoretically open to all. Those who 
reach the highest echelons of business usually came first or second in their year at grande 
école, a feat which allowed them to be culled from the rest of their classmates. One 
interviewee recounted how his position in the class had changed from fifth to second 
following reclassification; without this, he claimed, he would not have become the CEO 
of a leading French company.
29
 Competition within effectively closed groups is a critical 
factor contributing to a sense of meritocracy among those who comprise the elite. Yet 
only those with the requisite resources, confidence and connections can work the system 
to full advantage. The rhetoric of meritocracy deployed by the ruling class has 
nevertheless served its purpose, concealing and perpetuating the practices of social 
inequality in France, as elsewhere in the West.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Privatisation and the Changing Role of the State 
The growth of the French state proceeded apace in the early post-war years, with the 
nationalisation of energy, transport and the main banks taking place under de Gaulle in 
1945-1946, the reorganisation of welfare provision, and the introduction of planning in 
1947. Consequently, the state became the principal architect of economic modernisation. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the role of the state in the economy expanded further, with a large 
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In 1981, the socialists returned to power for the first time in a generation with an 
ambitious economic agenda, the cornerstone of which was an extensive nationalisation 
programme. A February 1982 law transferred ownership of 12 industrial groups from the 
private to the public sector. Seven featured amongst France’s top 20 largest companies, 
including five international groups. The state purchased a majority stake in two privately 
owned arms manufacturers. Two iron and steel firms were nationalised, alongside two 
investment banks, 36 smaller banks and the remaining private shares in the previously 
nationalised banking sector. By the early 1980s, the French public sector accounted for 
24 per cent of employees, 32 per cent of sales, 30 per cent of exports and 60 per cent of 
annual investment in the industrial and energy sectors.
31
 By 1984, however, a new 
consensus had begun to emerge among politicians, business leaders and the populace 
that, after years of expansion, the state had finally ‘reached its limits’.32 
 In 1986, just four years after extensive nationalisation, the incoming right-wing 
government introduced a far-reaching privatisation programme. As many as 66 firms, 
including 27 independent groups, with a combined workforce of 900,000 and an 
estimated overall value of FF300 billion (one quarter of the total capitalisation of the 
Bourse) were to be transferred to private ownership within five years. The immediate 
motivation for doing so was to undo what the left had done, but with Thatcherism and 
Reaganomics sweeping the globe, there was an appetite among right-wing politicians to 
change the rules of the economic game for good. Consequently, the political and 
ideological aspirations invested in the privatisation programme by the government were 
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considerable: the unfettering of the economy, which Balladur accused his socialist 
predecessors of having ‘mummified’ through nationalisation;33 the freedom of privatised 
companies to manage, released from the constraints of government interference, which 
had reached a paroxysm in the early socialist years; the free play of market forces and 
competition, to which the programme purported to reconcile the public at large; the 
freedom of the individual to become part of the nation’s prosperity through the purchase 
of a stake in some of its largest companies; and the freedom of the employees of 
privatised firms to purchase shares in the companies in which they worked, 10 per cent of 
each sale being reserved for the workforce. In short, as the state withdrew, it sought to 
devolve more responsibility to the individual in the name of making society as a whole 
more efficient and French business more competitive in European and global markets.
34
 
 Ostensibly, the programme enjoyed considerable success, until it was summarily 
cut short by the stock market crash of October 1987, bringing the programme to a halt in 
spring 1988. By then the number of French shareholders had increased sixfold, from 1.2 
million in 1986 to more than 7 million two years later, with a further 500,000 employees 
having purchased shares in their companies. There had been 11 flotations, all but one a 
huge success, including eight large groups and three off-market sales. Together they 
comprised one third of the government’s programme, boosting stock market 
capitalisation by nearly FF100 billion.
35
 
 The political pendulum swung repeatedly over the next decade, but privatisation 
remained a constant, despite differences in rhetoric and presentation. With the return to 
power of a socialist government in June 1988, following Mitterrand’s re-election to the 
presidency in May, privatisation continued in a clandestine manner, despite Mitterrand’s 
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election pledge that there would be ‘neither privatisations nor nationalisations’.36 The 
return of the right to government in March 1993, under the premiership of Balladur, 
signified a return to full-blown privatisation. The privatisation law of July 1993, 
modifying that of August 1986, allowed for the sale of 21 public-sector companies, 12 of 
which had featured in the list of 1986. They came from the banking, insurance, service 
and industrial sectors, employed a total workforce of more than one million, and enjoyed 
a combined turnover of around FF 1200 billion. The rules for foreign investors from 
outside the European Union were relaxed, their share limited to 20 per cent of the capital 
of the privatised firm, with foreign investors free to participate in groups of stable 
shareholders (groupes d’actionnaires stables).37 From 1995, Balladur’s influence waned 
following his failed bid for the presidency; his former friend and fellow Republican 
Chirac, against whom he stood, made sure of this when he became president. By 1997, 
when the socialists returned to government under the premiership of Lionel Jospin, public 
assets exceeding $40 billion in value had been sold. By then, any attempt to depart from 
the new ‘consensus’ over the proper division of responsibilities between the state and the 
private sector would have been arguably futile. As a concession to lingering sentiment 
within the socialist party, the Jospin government avoided using the word ‘privatisation’, 
while selling off stakes in banks, insurance companies and major industrial groups, such 
that by the end of the century all of France’s large banks were in private hands.38 
 
State-Business Relations and Social Networks 
The privatisation programme of the years between 1986 and 1998 changed the outward 
appearance of the French national business system. The idea that the state could and 
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should interfere directly in the day-to-day running of large, increasingly complex 
businesses, vetting investment plans and acting as financial broker and guarantor, was 
finally abandoned by politicians, business leaders and the public. French firms, in this 
sense, had accepted the need to be market facing and to compete openly with their 
foreign rivals. However, privatisation in France did not undermine the social networks, 
cemented by social capital, which lend French capitalism its distinctiveness and capacity 
for collective action in defence of national and sectional interests. Indeed, establishment 
solidarity was in many ways strengthened through the concentration of power in ‘hard 
cores’ of stable investors in newly privatised firms, known as noyaux durs. These were 
ostensibly designed to protect newly privatised firms from hostile, especially foreign, 
takeover following their change of status. At each privatisation about 10 companies were 
allocated between 0.5 per cent and 5 per cent of the capital of the firm being privatised, 
amounting to a total of 20-30 per cent, in return for which they received representation on 
the board, whereas individuals could purchase no more than 10 shares at a time, and had 
no say in how the companies were to be run. The stable nuclei were to last five years: 
their shares could not be sold for the first two years, and thereafter only to investors 
approved by the board.
39
 The systematic underpricing of shares by the Finance Minister, 
despite a small premium (about 5 per cent) to be paid by stable shareholders on top of the 
price paid by small investors, meant the creation of big business networks at bargain 
prices. These stable shareholders were chosen by the Finance Minister himself, he alone 
deciding the shareholding structure of each privatised enterprise, despite the setting up of 
a Privatisation Commission, comprising seven independent members. Throughout much 
of the process, Balladur wielded extraordinary powers, never previously enjoyed in 
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modern times by any of his predecessors at the Finance Ministry. In 1988 the sociologist 
Michel Bauer enumerated these as follows:  
  
To carry out a programme which was labelled ‘liberal’ the government was wary 
of market forces. Nor did it have recourse to an independent commission to which 
to turn to make a decision after public hearings. All the major decisions that had 
to be made to implement the policy of privatisation were, on the contrary, left to 
ministerial discretion. And the minister intervened not only to define the new 
rules of the game but also to fix the price, choose the shareholders, and decide on 
the composition of the board. There never was so powerful a Minister of Finance 
in France: never did the rue de Rivoli matter so much in the business world. The 
French privatisation programme did not represent any great break with the past. 





In this way, the effect of the noyaux durs was to establish an interlocking network 
of French-controlled holdings in the privatised companies, thereby reinforcing the 
traditional structures at the heart of French capitalism, long parodied as ‘capitalism 
without capital’, and without sanction.41 To create the groups of stable shareholders the 
government often relied on existing corporate networks; as the political scientist Joseph 
Szarka puts it, ‘state-sponsored cross-shareholding set the relations between privatized 
firms in concrete’.42 By January 1988 the noyaux durs comprised a total of 73 largely 
French groups positioned around three key poles, Paribas, Saint-Gobain and CGE-Société 
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Générale. Unsurprisingly, the chairmen of newly privatised companies welcomed the 
noyaux durs, seeking refuge in reciprocal shareholdings.
43
 Jean-Louis Beffa, head of 
Saint-Gobain, spoke warmly of the ‘element of comfort’ provided by Saint-Gobain’s 
participation in UAP’s hard core of shareholders.44 Thus, in the first wave of 
pirvatisation, the heads of all newly privatised firms retained their positions, in contrast to 
the nationalisations of 1981-1982, when as many as 29 heads of the 36 largest state-
owned companies had lost their jobs.
45
 Surviving heads included some appointed under 
the socialists, such as Beffa, who became Chairman and CEO or Président Directeur-
Général (PDG) of Saint-Gobain in January 1986. The positions of the PDG of privatised 
firms were thus rendered more permanent, the privatisation of the companies they 
managed effectively putting them beyond the jurisdiction of any incoming 
administration. Beffa retained his position as head of Saint-Gobain for 21 years, until 
2007, when he became Chairman.  
In the privatisation waves of 1986-1988 and again in 1993-1995, with Balladur in 
charge as Finance Minister and later as Prime Minister, the noyaux durs were often 
peopled by personal and political friends of Balladur himself, provoking accusations of 
cronyism (copinage) from the socialist opposition and the press. A number of 
establishment figures saw their power strengthened considerably through ties of 
friendship to Balladur and loyalty to the right-wing Gaullist administration. These 
included leading members of the Corps des Mines, the Inspection des Finances and the 
Corps des Ponts et Chaussées; advisers to former presidents and prime ministers; the 
directors of ministerial cabinets; and close friends of Chirac and Balladur. Jean-Claude 
Trichet, who served under Balladur in 1986 as director of his ministerial cabinet, went on 
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to become head of the Bank of France and, later, President of the European Central Bank. 
Jean-Marie Messier, who worked under Balladur as an adviser to the privatisation 
process (1986-1988), later gained notoriety as head of Vivendi.
46
 Together, these ‘Lords 
of the Balladur State’ formed a so-called ‘Balladur network’ at the centre of French 
capitalism, embracing the main banks, BNP, Société Générale, CCF and the Bank of 
France, and likened to the financiers responsible for the collection of taxes under the 
ancien régime, the so-called ‘fermiers généraux’.47 
In 1994 the Nouvel Observateur identified three epochs and loci where these 
individuals’ loyalties to Balladur were forged and his patronage secured. These include 
the headquarters of Alcatel-Alsthom in the sixteenth arrondissement in the 1970s, when 
Balladur managed several of the company’s subsidiaries; the Finance Ministry on the Rue 
de Rivoli from 1986 to 1988, where Balladur served as Minister of Finance; and his 
office at 215 bis, Boulevard Saint-Germain, between 1988 and 1993, where he prepared 
his bid for the premiership, keeping his contacts warm by holding regular monthly 
dinners for those who had worked with him in the Finance Ministry. It pointed out, 
further, that, by the mid-1990s, this small number of loyal associates enjoyed significant 
command over resources, controlling approximately 20 per cent of the stock market 
between them as company heads.
48
  
Table 3 illustrates the interlocking mandates which characterised the 15 largest 
French privatised companies in 1998. Of particular note here is the extent to which CEOs 
continued to network with each other. The organizational sociologist Michael Useem, 
author of The Inner Circle (1984), regards membership on two or three boards as 
constituting elite ‘inner circle’ membership. The third column of the table indicates the 
 18 
degree to which key CEOs enjoyed board interlocks with others in the sample, revealing 
a high degree of endogeneity, averaging five interlocks per CEO. This was despite the 
fact that from late 1995, the hard cores of stable shareholders had begun to unravel, with 
major holdings beginning to be sold without prior warning.
49
 The disintegration of the 
noyaux durs persisted with the arrival in France from 1997 of foreign, often US, 
institutional investors, who quickly acquired 40 per cent of the share capital of leading 
listed French companies.
50
 Nevertheless, while the unraveling of the noyaux durs may 
have reduced some of the financial linkages between privatised firms, it did not, as Table 
3 reveals, reduce the networks of influence linking them in the search for mutual 
advantage. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
 The social networks of French CEOs are not only dense but extensive, reaching 
well beyond the boardrooms of major firms into other strongholds of the ruling elite. 
Membership on the boards of not-for-profit, cultural, educational, sporting, and 
governmental organisations and commissions provides further opportunities to make 
connections, establish norms and positions, and more generally provide support and 
express solidarity. Table 4 is indicative. It demonstrates how the CEOs of the 15 largest 
privatised French companies in 1998 networked beyond the corporate field, extending 
into the wider field of power, illustrating the connections between ‘life worlds’, 
particularly those of politics and business, a key feature of inner-circle membership in 
France. Business associations and public bodies served as the privileged arenas for 
meeting outside the organisational field, with all 15 CEOs taking a leading role within 
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business associations and 12 within public bodies, while the governing bodies and alumni 
associations of elite, public institutions of higher education also prove popular. It makes 
good sense to focus energies on educational institutions, preparing and shaping future 
generations, building loyalties to their donors’ own schools and the cultures they embody 
all the while. Charity boards and those of national cultural or sporting institutions feature 
much less prominently, being at one remove from mainstream business and political 
activities. 
  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The mechanisms and concepts of social capital alert us to what was really going on 
within the French ruling elite during the privatisation era, encouraging the researcher to 
attempt to pin down the connections between key political and business actors. It is only 
through seeking evidence, painstakingly recording data such as schools and institutions of 
higher education attended, career types and boards elite members serve on, that otherwise 
hidden patterns begin to emerge. In this case, the patterns reveal, for example, that 12 out 
of the 15 CEOs of French privatised companies in 1998 had begun their career in public 
administration, several at the Treasury, from which they moved into the world of 
business in a process known as pantouflage, literally ‘shuffling across’ (see Table 2). It is 
for this reason that Szarka dubs privatisation ‘the acme of pantouflage’, since ‘when 
public sector firms [were] privatized, top fonctionnaires [were] spared the burden of 
finding posts in the private sector’.51 The evidence presented in Table 2 confirms this 
assessment. 
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Privatisation in France from 1986 to 1998 did succeed in increasing both the size 
of the Bourse and the number of individual shareholders in France. In the period 1995-
1998 in particular, the market capitalisation of the Bourse more than doubled, growing by 
227 per cent. By 1998, it had become an increasingly significant vehicle for raising funds 
on the part of France’s leading companies, as well as medium-sized businesses (the 
second marché, established in 1983), and young, potentially high-growth companies (the 
nouveau marché, founded in 1996).
52 
 
Privatisation did not, however, represent any great break with the past; rather, it 
confirmed the state’s long-standing interventionist tradition, and strengthened the ties 
binding the business elite. Despite professing to withdraw from the market, forego 
intervention and promote competition, Szarka concludes that ‘decision-makers in the 
main industries and in government still [formed] a closed circle and [continued] to 
collaborate’.53 In 1987 Balladur asserted that ‘The economic liberty which constitutes the 
main objective of the government’s policy is not the freedom of a chosen few, but 
concerns all French people’.54 Yet despite promises that privatisation would popularise 
capitalism and change the French economic landscape, elite business networks continued 
to dominate the corporate landscape after privatisation as they had done throughout the 
twentieth century. The process served to put in place a ‘new’, more select and more 
permanent economic technocracy loyal to the right-wing Gaullist Party. Business leaders 
with numerous connections, rich in social capital, often serving on multiple boards, were 
amongst the principal beneficiaries. Balladur himself offered a simple (if unconvincing) 
explanation, writing in Je crois en l’homme plus qu’en l’Etat: ‘We needed a greater 
concentration of power at the time in order to build greater freedom for tomorrow’,55 
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reminiscent of Marx’s prediction that after taking total power, the communist state would 
wither away. 
One question that arises concerns the relative lack of countervailing forces. Why 
was there not more opposition to such flagrant cronyism amongst the general public? The 
answer is threefold. The first part concerns public attitudes to privatisation. The 
nationalisations of 1982 had quickly emerged as a very expensive mistake. In the teeth of 
world recession, with so many demands being made on the Treasury, the ‘shareholder 
state’ had proved unable to provide the nationalised companies with much-needed funds 
for investment. Privatisation represented the undoing of this, while the rhetoric of popular 
capitalism masked the elitist nature of the methods employed. Second, the public are in 
general persuaded by the rhetoric of meritocracy, which goes hand-in-hand with 
perceived egalitarianism, a central tenet of the Republic. Accordingly, the elite grandes 
écoles are state schools, not private schools. Public acceptance of a system designed to 
serve elites and their offspring while masquerading as a meritocracy depends, also, on the 
reverse side of the coin: the maintenance of the right of entry to university for all who 
leave school with the baccalauréat. It is important for political elites to maintain public 
confidence in the fiction that everyone has an equal chance of success, and the fact that 
the odd person rises from the lower classes to the top bolsters the myth of meritocracy. 
Third, the cronyism exemplified here is part of a set of deep-seated traditionalist 
inclinations which includes a widespread tolerance of practices reminiscent of pre-
Revolutionary mercantilism. Such cronyism runs deep within the French ruling classes, 
on both sides of the political divide. Chirac, for example, was said to have created a 
‘Chirac-State’ during his time at the Elysée, filling key appointments with individuals 
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loyal to himself, on an unprecedented scale. There have at times been scandals. President 
Mitterrand appointed his own son, Jean-Christophe, as an adviser to the Elysée on Africa 
from 1986 to 1992; Jean-Christophe was later imprisoned, suspected of having used his 
influence to secure two arms deals.
56
 The former Prime Minister Edith Cresson 
(appointed by Mitterrand as premier in 1991, then as European Commissioner in 1994, 
and rumoured to have been his mistress) was accused of nepotism when she took almost 
her whole team with her to Brussels on becoming a Commissioner, contributing to the 
resignation of the European Commission en masse in 1999. Cresson even hired her 
dentist as an HIV/AIDs adviser, though he had no experience in this field. When 
questioned by a journalist she allegedly retorted, ‘Should we only work with people we 
have never seen before?’57 In general, a deep-seated acceptance of such practices 
prevails, perhaps as a modern-day transposition of behaviour patterns typical of the 
courts of the ancien régime. The French, arguably, have never really got over discarding 
their monarchy. Tellingly, the celebrated French cartoonist, Plantu, always depicted 
Balladur as a pre-Revolutionary courtier complete with powdered wig, tailcoat and 
breeches. 
Citing Earl Graves, Pamela Laird asserts in Pull that: ‘The ambitious… “never 
forget that business is personal” and that the person who “builds the strongest 
relationship wins”’.58 The French privatisation programme amply demonstrates the 
relevance of this statement. Elite members who saw their command of the field of 
corporate power strengthened through their companies’ participation in the noyaux durs 
of privatised firms often went on to enjoy significant spoils, likened to ‘baronies’ in the 
French press.
59
 These were facilitated above all by their ties of friendship and loyalty to 
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key figures in the right-wing Gaullist administration, Balladur in particular. As Monjardet 
notes, the power to appoint to the board is considerable indeed: ‘Control is, quite simply, 
the capacity to make or unmake a board of directors’.60 This was a privilege of which 
Balladur availed himself abundantly during this time. 
For some business leaders, the benefits that flowed from this took the form of a 
lengthy and lucrative career at the head of one of France’s top companies, as exemplified 
by Beffa at Saint-Gobain. Some accumulated exceptional personal wealth, as illustrated 
by Philippe Jaffré, head of Elf-Aquitaine. In 1987, keen to boost the Paris Bourse, 
Balladur had introduced a favourable tax regime for stock options, enabling the senior 
executives of newly privatised companies to put in place schemes highly beneficial to 
themselves, entailing minimal risk.
61
 A major public scandal broke when it emerged that 
Jaffré had received between €23 million and €38 million, largely in stock options, on 
leaving Elf when it was acquired by Total in 1999. 
Clearly, the ‘new rules’ of the economic game were not all they seemed. 
Ultimately, the rules driving who has access to power in and ownership of French 
privatised companies emerge as the oldest rules of all: the imperatives of social capital. 
An on-going failure to move away from traditional social capital-based appointments, 
retaining personal relations as the dominant criterion, arguably suggests a failure to 
‘modernise’. This is ironic, since privatisation was justified as part of ‘modernisation’, to 
promote a more outward-looking, competitive ‘liberal’ economy designed to meet the 
challenges of the fast-approaching Single European Market.  
The ‘game’ itself underwent various changes during the period under scrutiny. 
There were changes in the name of the game, and the stated purposes for playing. There 
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was a significant reduction in the number of empowered players, surrounded by a large 
number of pawns who might have thought they were in the game, as employee 
shareholders or small investors, but were not. In essence, however, the purpose of the 
game remained the same: the preservation of corporate and political power, and the 
trappings it brings, in the hands of a small French ruling elite jealously guarding its own 
privileges, manipulating circumstances and events to its collective advantage. 
Networking is an institutional feature in France, systemically embedded and 
supported by the state through its systems of education, elite selection and recruitment, 
and political patronage. While obvious advantages accrue to individual business leaders 
rich in social capital who gain from the system, able to use their capital in a variety of 
ways to maintain their dominant position, French society as a whole must bear the costs. 
The rigorous selection procedures of the elite grandes écoles mean that they produce too 
few graduates every year to meet the managerial needs of French businesses. Embittered 
students who see their career prospects wither when they fail to qualify for selection 
represent a significant waste of talent, while the French university system is overutilised, 
but undervalued, in comparison. 
French society as a whole may also lose out in another respect. Sociologists Burt 
et al. establish that successful French managers, like successful American managers, 
‘tend to have networks rich in structural holes’, that is, ‘disconnections between non-
redundant contacts in a network’.62 Yet social capital, they find, emerges differently in 
France and the US, a difference which Frank and Yasumoto attribute to the importance of 
particularistic obligations in France, where the social structure is especially dense.
63
 
Within such networks, common norms of behaviour are more likely to develop, 
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sanctioning against hostile acts and opportunism. Burt et al. found the French firm to 
have a less porous boundary than the American firm, while the sociologist Charles 
Kadushin highlights the striking homogeneity of the inner core of the French financial 
elite.
64
 In the close-knit structure of elite French business circles, unity of outlook and 
policy, fostering ‘group think’, may ultimately lead to a separation of the elite from the 
wider social body, as well as poor decision making.
65
  
Whatever the merits of this critique, there can be no doubt that the high levels of 
social capital present within the French national business system made for a remarkably 
smooth series of privatisations between 1986 and 1998. Privatisation was centrally 
coordinated and controlled by Balladur, with the business elite fully behind the process to 
‘undo’ the mistakes of nationalisation. Leading firms invested in the capital of companies 
undergoing privatisation, and elite directors played prominent roles in their noyaux durs. 
Seemingly dramatic changes in the rules of the game had very little impact on the 
structure and objectives of the game itself. Members of the ruling elite, united by multiple 
ties and similar backgrounds, connived, as before, to manipulate institutions and 
situations in their perceived collective interest. While the UK, alongside others, has 
worked under international treaties and agreements to create a level playing-field for 
domestic and foreign firms, the French approach has remained stubbornly different: the 
old instinct of both state and business community remains, powerful as ever, to intervene 
to keep failing firms alive and to do everything possible to keep French companies and 
assets in French hands, while actively promoting expansion overseas. As the writer 
Ignazio Silone eloquently puts it: ‘the long arm [of the French government] is used to 
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Notes: The named companies were released directly from public into private ownership or grew 
substantially through the acquisition of a previously state-owned company, as in the case of AXA 
through its takeover of Union des Assurances de Paris (UAP). The privatisation of Compagnie 








  (M€) (No.)  
     
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux Gérard Mestrallet  72,145  175,000  1987 
France Télécom Michel Bon   30,060  165,042  1997 
Elf Aquitaine Philippe Jaffré   26,484  83,700  1994 
AXA Claude Bébéar   26,420  11,700  1994 
Rhône-Poulenc Jean-René Fourtou  24,348  68,400  1993 
Saint-Gobain Jean-Louis Beffa  22,182  107,968  1986 
Société Générale Daniel Bouton  22,011  55,465  1987 
Seita Jean-Dominique Comolli  19,601  8,146  1995 
Alcatel Serge Tchuruk   18,336  189,549  1987 
BNP Michel Pébereau  18,185  5,138  1993 
Total Thierry Desmarest  15,809  54,381  1993 
Renault Louis Schweitzer  15,522  140,905  1994 
Usinor Francis Mer  10,543  51,394  1995 
Alstom Pierre Bilger  5,771  110,000  1987 
Pechiney Jean-Pierre Rodier  4,901  34,000  1995 




Educational and Career Backgrounds of the Chief Executive Officers of the 15 




Notes: Aspiring French leaders regularly attend one or more elite higher education institutions. 








Gérard Mestrallet Elite Parisian 
Lycée 
Polytechnique +  
Grande Ecole ‘Aviation 
Civile’ 
Yes None Public 
Administration 
Michel Bon  Elite Provincial 
Lycée 





Philippe Jaffré  Elite Parisian 
Lycée 





Claude Bébéar  Elite Parisian 
Lycée 
Polytechnique + Institut 
des Actuaires 
No None Business 
Jean-René Fourtou Elite Provincial 
Lycée 
Polytechnique No None Business 
Jean-Louis Beffa Non-Elite 
Provincial Lycée 
Polytechnique + Grande 
Ecole ‘Pétrole et des 
Moteurs’ + Sciences-Po 




Daniel Bouton Non-Elite 
Parisian Lycée 









Paris II + Sciences-Po Yes None Public 
Administration 
Serge Tchuruk  Elite Provincial 
Lycée 
Polytechnique + Grande 
Ecole ‘L’Armement’ 
No None Business 
Michel Pébereau Elite Parisian 
Lycée 





Thierry Desmarest Elite Parisian 
Lycée 
Polytechnique + Ecole 
des Mines 




Louis Schweitzer Elite Provincial 
Lycée 





Francis Mer Elite Provincial 
Lycée 
Polytechnique + Ecole 
des Mines 




Pierre Bilger Elite Parisian 
Lycée 





Jean-Pierre Rodier Non-Elite 
Provincial Lycée 
Polytechnique + Ecole 
des Mines 






Corporate Networking Characteristics of the Chief Executive Officers of 15 





























Notes:  The top 100 companies in France in 1998 are those identified in Maclean et al. (2006). 
Executive networkers sit on the boards of one or more companies in addition to that in which they 
serve as an executive, whereas dedicated executives are affiliated to a single company. An 
interlock exists when two directors within the sample serve contemporaneously on the board of 
the same company. 
CEO Name Director Type 
Membership of 













    
Gérard Mestrallet Exec. Networker 6 3 6 
Michel Bon  Exec. Networker 5 1 1 
Philippe Jaffré  Exec. Networker 4 2 6 
Claude Bébéar  Exec. Networker 3 0 9 
Jean-René Fourtou Exec. Networker 4 1 7 
Jean-Louis Beffa Exec. Networker 4 8 11 
Daniel Bouton Exec. Networker 2 1 5 
Jean-Dominique Comolli Exec. Networker 2 0 1 
Serge Tchuruk  Exec. Networker 6 0 5 
Michel Pébereau Exec. Networker 7 1 12 
Thierry Desmarest Exec. Networker 2 0 3 
Louis Schweitzer Exec. Networker 3 1 4 
Francis Mer Exec. Networker 3 3 1 
Pierre Bilger Exec. Networker 2 1 3 
Jean-Pierre Rodier Dedicated Exec. 1 0 1 
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Table 4: Non-Corporate Board or Commission Memberships of the Chief 
Executive Officers of the 15 Largest Privatised Companies in France in 1998 
 










Gérard Mestrallet No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
Michel Bon Yes Yes Yes Yes No 4 
Philippe Jaffré No Yes Yes No No 2 
Claude Bébéar No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
Jean-Rene Fourtou No Yes Yes Yes No 3 
Jean-Louis Beffa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 
Daniel Bouton No Yes Yes Yes No 3 
Jean-Dominique Comolli No Yes Yes No No 2 
Serge Tchuruk No No Yes Yes No 2 
Michel Pébereau No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
Thierry Desmerest No No Yes No No 1 
Louis Schweitzer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 
Francis Mer No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
Pierre Bilger No Yes Yes No No 2 
Jean-Pierre Rodier No No Yes Yes No 2 
Total Memberships 3 12 15 11 6 47 
 
Notes: The qualifying period for membership of a board or commission was 1993-2003 and 
covered (a) large charitable bodies; (b) government commissions and central and local 
government bodies including mayoralties; (c) national and international industry lobbying, 
representative and standards organisations; (d) governing bodies and alumni associations of elite 
higher education institutions; (e) national cultural or sporting organisations. 
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